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Abstract 
We empirically investigate the joint training decisions of workers and firms. The aim of our 
study is to learn how various cost components affect workers’ (non-)participation in training. 
In particular, we separately consider monetary and non-monetary training costs, which is 
possible thanks to an especially rich dataset that includes both participants and non-
participants. Our estimation results show that workers whose firms cover some of their 
training costs would generally be more likely to have assumed the full training costs 
themselves had they not received employer support. Moreover, the share of self-financed 
training, as compared to employer-supported training, is generally low. Thus, firms moderate 
virtually all training decisions and, as a result, considerably influence (non-)participation 
patterns. Interestingly, although training non-participation can be attributed to both monetary 
and non-monetary costs, the latter seem to comprise the more binding restriction. That is, time 
is more costly than money. 
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1. Introduction 
Continuing vocational training is becoming increasingly important, largely because of 
technological change and demographic trends. Today, occupations involve greater complexity 
than they did some decades ago (Spitz-Oener 2006). These changing job requirements come 
along with a growing demand for (highly) skilled labor and, as a consequence, for further 
training. In addition to the skill-biased technological change, there is evidence of depreciation 
of knowledge and skills (Janssen/Backes-Gellner 2009), which particularly affects older 
workers, who, due to recent demographic trends, form a constantly rising proportion of the 
workforce. Hence, continuing vocational training seems indispensable to make up for such 
effects and ensure sustainable labor market success. 
Considering these developments, it is little surprising that numerous empirical studies provide 
evidence for training to have positive impacts on individuals’ labor market outcomes (for an 
international overview see Bassanini et al. 2005, for Germany see Büchel/Pannenberg 2003): 
training is found to be associated with significant wage increase, lower risk of unemployment 
or higher promotion probability. But all of these studies focus on returns. 
However, a worker’s decision to undertake training is not only determined by expected 
rewards, but also by expected costs. Therefore, analyses focusing on benefits might not be 
able to fully explain the observed (non-)participation training patterns. There are only a few 
studies that consider training costs in detail. This is mostly due to a lack of appropriate data. 
In this study, we are fortunate to be able to use a dataset that provides extensive cost 
information. Hence, we analyze training probabilities with a focus on the cost component in 
order to determine how different types of costs affect workers’ participation. 
There are two important points to be noted regarding workers’ training costs. First, employers 
can be involved in training decisions by sharing training costs, which makes firms important 
players for the outcome of training decisions. Accordingly, to explain training patterns we 
have to distinguish between the case in which training costs are (partly) covered by the firm, 
referred to as employer-supported training and the case in which the worker bears training 
costs entirely on their own, referred to as self-financed training. Second, there are different 
types of costs (as there are various types of benefits), which can be categorized in two main 
components: aside from the most obvious monetary costs (i.e., training expenses), there are 
also non-monetary costs (i.e., time spent in training) attached to participation.  
In this study, we analyze training participation patterns and aim to discover the extent to 
which these are due to the combined effect of workers and employers decisions and the role 
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of different training costs therein. In a first step, we study workers’ probabilities of self-
financing training conditional on receiving no employer support. In a second step, we 
examine the relation between the firms’ and workers’ training decisions. 
As monetary and non-monetary costs can be expected to play different roles, all analyses are 
performed separately for these two cost components. In small firms, for instance, in which the 
production process is dependent on every single worker, participation during working hours 
might be excessively costly (as this would result in production loss). Nevertheless, support for 
a worker’s training participation during leisure time might be possible. As another example, 
one could think of a worker with a long journey to work. Such a person might rather be 
willing to pay for training than to participate after working hours in the evening. Thus, we 
expect the distinction between the two groups of costs to be instructive for the understanding 
of training participation patterns. 
To date, evidence regarding the joint training decisions of workers and firms (and thus 
training costs) has generally been scarce and is predominantly focused on employer-supported 
training (cf. e.g., Oosterbeek 1998 or Groot 1999). One notable exception is Bassanini et al., 
(2005) who simultaneously analyze the probability of employer-sponsored and non-sponsored 
training. The authors focus on differences in the impact of employment and individual 
characteristics on the respective training probabilities. However, they do not examine to what 
extent non-participation can be attributed to lack of employers’ or workers’ willingness to 
bear training costs, nor do they distinguish between the various cost components. Hence, 
when looking at employer-supported and self-financed training, we contribute to the existing 
literature by considering both monetary and non-monetary costs separately and by studying 
workers’ willingness to completely bear training costs. This might help in understanding the 
issue of training (non-)participation. 
The conceptual difficulty in analyzing these issues is that we observe whether a worker 
participates in training without knowing the reason why or why not. It is challenging to 
disentangle the effect of either side on the result, since we have no information on the 
individual decision of one of the parties if the other has decided differently – or even 
similarly. However, we are fortunate to be able to utilize a unique dataset of both participants 
and non-participants, which for the first time provides extensive cost information. It 
particularly provides separate and detailed information on monetary and non-monetary costs 
associated with training participation. 
Based on this data, we are able to disentangle the firms’ and the workers’ impact on training 
decisions. Our findings show, first, that those workers who are considered for employer-
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supported training would also be more likely to have self-financed their training had they not 
received this support. Second, looking at the two cost components separately, we find that for 
workers the willingness to bear monetary costs is much higher than it is to bear non-monetary 
costs, which emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between various cost components. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section two we present some theoretical 
considerations concerning the training decisions of workers and firms. Subsequently, section 
three details the econometric model. In section four we describe the participants and non-
participants survey and provide some descriptive statistics concerning the probability of 
employer-supported versus self-financed training participation. The results of the empirical 
investigation are presented in section five, and conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
 
2. Theoretical framework of the training decisions of workers and firms 
Following Bassanini et al. (2005: 71-72), we assume that training decisions are undertaken 
sequentially (cf. Figure 1): first, a firm decides whether to support a worker’s training 
participation. We argue that employer-supported training is part of a worker’s job and thus 
that there is no (subsequent) decision for the worker whether to accept training.1 This is why 
employer-supported training directly results in a worker’s training participation. If the 
employer does not provide training support, the worker chooses whether or not to bear the full 
training costs himself. Thus, we distinguish between two types of training: on the one hand, 
we consider workers whose training costs are (partly) covered by their firm. This case will be 
referred to as employer-supported training. On the other hand, we consider workers who lack 
employer support and must bear the entire training costs alone. This case will be referred to as 
self-financed training. 
                                                 
1 Of course, some workers might also refuse to participate, even though they would receive employer support. 
However, we assume that such cases constitute an exception. First, in our dataset, some training participants 
report being forced to undertake training. Second, most non-participants report a lack of employer support as 
(one) cause of their non-participation (indicating the importance of employer-support). 
  
 5
Figure 1: Sequence of training decisions 
 
 
To analyze the two subsequent training decisions of firms and workers, we use standard 
human capital theory (Becker 1975) as a framework. Each party can be supposed to invest in 
training if their expected benefits exceed their expected costs. The cost-benefit ratio and thus 
the willingness to bear training costs vary between workers and firms according to personal 
attributes, employment characteristics, and training content.  
As concerns the latter (i.e., training content), the most prevalent distinction is between general 
and (firm-) specific human capital. We will show in the following two paragraphs that firms 
basically pay for training that imparts either type of knowledge: 
In the standard analysis of human capital, it is argued that costs and returns to investments in 
specific human capital are shared by firms and workers because of uncertainty about post-
investment behavior (Becker 1962) or because of the existence of transaction costs in 
evaluating and agreeing on a worker’s productivity (Hashimoto 1981). Sharing investments 
therefore reduces the risk of separation and of losing a portion of an investment. It should be 
noted that sharing of human capital investments is expected to be widely observed, 
independent of the exact concept of specific human capital. Becker (1962), on the one hand, 
argues that much of the training has general as well as specific components but increases the 
worker’s productivity more for the firm providing the training and is therefore referred to as 
specific training. In contrast, Lazear (2003) considers all training as general, but he assumes 
that each firm requires only a specific combination of skills.  
When training is perfectly general, workers can capture the entire return to training (because 
general human capital would be just as useful in other firms) and, consequently, they also 
have to bear the full costs associated with training participation. This supposition, however, 
only holds as long as the labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. As soon as this 
Employer-supported training 
Self-financed training 
(Workers bearing full training costs, 
given no employer support) 
Non-participation Training participation 
STEP 2 
STEP 1 
Training participation 
NO
NO 
YES
YES
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assumption is relaxed, employers can again be expected to share in training investments. If 
the worker’s wage is below his productivity level, and the difference increases with skill level 
(due to a compressed wage structure), the employer has an incentive to invest in training 
because he can capture some of the return (see for example Acemoglu/Pischke 1999 or 
Booth/Zoega 2004). Thus, employers can generally be expected to pay for (firm-) specific as 
well as supposedly general human capital; therefore, we consider training of either content in 
our empirical analyses. 
In the following paragraphs, we briefly specify which personal and employment attributes are 
expected to be associated with favorable cost-benefit ratios for firms, and we do the same for 
workers. Starting with individual characteristics, theoretical predictions concerning workers’ 
and employers’ training decisions are (mostly) identical. For instance, one usually assumes a 
complementarity between education and training, in which more educated workers are 
expected to have a greater willingness to undertake training, as well as a higher probability of 
being selected for employer-supported training.2 The same applies to motivation and training 
because they are also assumed to exhibit a complementary relationship. As concerns gender 
differences, male workers can be expected to have a higher average training probability.3 This 
again applies for employer-supported as well as for self-financed training. First, one would 
expect the probability of being selected for training by the employer to be higher for 
individuals who are regarded as being more committed to the firm. As Booth (1991: 285) 
points out, in preferring workers who seem more committed to the firm, employers 
discriminate against women. Secondly, the higher willingness of male workers to undertake 
training might arise from differences in preferences. These gender differences might even be 
more pronounced in the group of workers with children – i.e., having children might further 
reduce the average training probabilities of women.4 Finally, following human capital theory, 
one would expect younger and full-time workers to have higher training probabilities than 
older and part-time workers because the expected pay-off period for the former two groups is 
                                                 
2 Mincer (1962: 59) might have been the first to suggest the notion of complementarities between education and 
training, stating that school education has to be seen as a prerequisite for further training. Rosen (1976) specifies 
that more education enables individuals to exhibit greater job learning efficiency. 
3 It should be noted that in looking at participation patterns for women, as compared to those for men, one has to 
distinguish two sources of variability (Arulampalam et al. 2004: 355): on the one hand, the two groups might 
differ in respect of personal attributes and employment characteristics, while on the other hand there might also 
exist differences in the returns to training in the context of similar exhibited characteristics. This is why we 
perform separate analyses for men and women.  
4 From an employer’s perspective, women with young children are usually expected to have a weaker attachment 
to the labor market than are men with young children. From an individual’s perspective, having children might 
be associated with a substantial increase in the discount rate; on the other hand, and this might be especially true 
for male workers, having children might involve greater responsibilities and consequently a greater motivation to 
accumulate new human capital (Arulampalam/Booth 2001: 387), which could then counteract the 
aforementioned negative effect. 
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longer. Generally, this effect operates through both channels (i.e., through both workers’ and 
firms’ decisions). However, for the employer it is not so much mere age as the expectation of 
how long the worker will stay in the firm which is important. As older employees might find 
it more difficult to secure better job matches, they have a lower probability of leaving. Thus, 
it may as well be less risky for the employer to invest in these workers, which in turn might 
counteract the effect of a longer expected pay-off period for younger workers. So the overall 
effect is not clear ex ante. 
To summarize, almost all individual characteristics are expected to have no systematically 
different impacts on the training decisions of firms and workers. As employment 
characteristics are generally expected to predominantly operate through the employers’ 
decision to support training (because they influence companies’ training costs and benefits) 
they do not affect (or at least do not counteract) this positive correlation between the two 
training decisions. Thus, we expect the two training decisions to be related as follows:  
Those workers who receive employer-supported training are also the ones more likely  
to have borne the full training costs themselves had they not received employer support.  
Of course, this hypothesis is difficult to test because we have no data regarding what would 
have occurred had the worker not received employer-supported training. Thus, we need an 
econometric method that will help us to disentangle the two effects and estimate the 
counterfactual (i.e., what would have happened if those workers who receive employer-
supported training had not received such support). 
Though a worker’s true willingness to bear the full training costs might as well be hidden for 
the firm, the latter might have a guess about the worker’s training decision in case of not 
being selected for employer-supported training. This question will be addressed in the 
empirical part. In the next section, we detail the exact estimation procedure applied to test the 
hypothesis. 
 
3. Modeling the worker’s and firm’s decision to bear training costs 
In the first step of the analysis, the goal is to sort out which factors determine the probability 
of receiving employer-supported training and which factors impact individuals’ willingness to 
self-finance training participation. As it is likely that there exists a link between the firm’s and 
the worker’s training decisions, we use an empirical framework that explicitly takes account 
of this potential dependence. In a second step, based on these estimations, we calculate 
predicted training probabilities and assess whether those workers whose firm covers (part of) 
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the training costs would have borne the full costs themselves had they not received employer 
support. Finally, we examine the relation between the two training decisions. 
 
3.1 Employer-supported training 
The likelihood of a worker to take part in training primarily depends on the probability of 
receiving employer support. Firms are expected to select those workers who have the ability 
to benefit from training as well as those who are likely to remain with the firm after training. 
To estimate the impact of these characteristics on the probability of employer-supported 
training, we use the following probit model framework: 
ffff EPy εγβ +⋅+⋅=*  
1=fy  if 0* ≥fy  (1) 
0=fy  if 0* <fy  
The latent index yf* models the underlying process of a firm’s decision to support an 
employee’s training participation by bearing (part of) the training costs. If a worker receives 
employer-supported training, yf takes the value one, and zero otherwise. Pf and Ef represent 
vectors of personnel characteristics and employment characteristics, respectively; εf indicates 
the error term. Receiving employer support for training participation might be a strong 
predictor of actual participation. Nevertheless, we also observe workers who lack employer 
support and individually arrange and finance their participation (e.g., Greenhalgh/Malvrotas 
1994). Hence, we additionally have to analyze the probability that a worker bears full training 
costs conditional on no employer support. 
 
3.2 Workers bearing full training costs, given no employer support  
Following Bassanini et al. (2005: 71-72), we assume that training decisions are undertaken 
sequentially (cf. section 2). The problems to be solved in the empirical analysis are, first, that 
the two decisions are expected to be related, and second, that all workers are obviously only 
observed in one situation (i.e., we do not know what would have happened if those workers 
who receive employer-supported training had not received such support). Thus, we have a 
censored dependent variable and a potentially selected sample of workers in the second step 
of the analysis. 
The model to be used for such a framework is the censored bivariate probit model (Van de 
Ven/Van Praag 1981): the probability of receiving employer-supported training is observed 
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for the full sample of workers. But for the second step, the probability that a worker bears full 
training costs, there is a censored dependent variable and a potentially selected sample of 
workers. The model takes account of a potential correlation ρ of unobserved factors that have 
an impact on both equations, and we jointly estimate both equations with maximum 
likelihood. Although the bivariate probit with censoring does not require an exclusion 
restriction (i.e., a variable that has an impact on the selection equation but that does not affect 
the outcome equation), we include an additional variable that satisfies the exclusion 
restriction. Hence, the model structure can be written as follows:5 
yf=1: Prob (yf=1|xw, xf) 
yw=0, yf=0: Prob (yw=0, yf=0|xw, xf) (2) 
yw=1, yf=0: Prob (yw=1, yf=0|xw, xf) 
where yw takes the value one if a worker self-finances his training participation and zero 
otherwise. This decision is expected to be determined by personal and employment 
characteristics reflected in xw. Similarly, yf indicates employer-supported training and, thus, xf 
is a vector consisting of the aforementioned personnel (Pf) and employment (Ef) 
characteristics. According to this model, there are three observations to be distinguished and 
three probabilities to be estimated. Based on these estimations, we then calculate the predicted 
probability of self-financing participation for the full sample (cf. section 3.3). 
We are not the first to use the bivariate probit model with censoring to analyze training 
decisions. Bassanini et al. (2005) also estimate a bivariate probit with censoring, in which 
employers decide on whether to pay for workers’ training, and unsupported workers then 
choose whether or not to self-finance their training participation. Oosterbeek (1998) has also 
used this framework, but, instead of considering self-financed training, he focuses on 
employer-supported training and models the distinct decisions of firms and workers. Unlike in 
our framework, employer-supported training is conditional on a worker’s willingness to 
participate. The fact that, in our dataset, some workers report being forced to participate in 
training, leads us to prefer the framework introduced by Bassanini et al. (2005).  
A test of our hypothesis requires information about each workers’ willingness to bear training 
costs (i.e., also for those who currently receive employer support). In the next section, we 
explain how these probabilities of workers to bear full training costs are estimated.  
 
                                                 
5 The notation is based on Greene (2003: 713-714). 
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3.3 Predicted probabilities that workers would bear the full training costs 
Before comparing the probabilities that workers will bear full training costs when not 
receiving employer-supported training, it is first necessary to address the problem that this 
probability can only be observed for those not currently receiving employer-supported 
training. Therefore, based on the estimation described above, we calculate a hypothetical 
conditional probability6 for self-financing training. This can be accomplished for the full 
sample of workers and allows for testing the hypothesis that those workers who receive 
employer-supported training would also have been more likely to have borne the full training 
costs themselves had they not received employer support. Moreover, we are interested in 
learning whether the results depend on the cost measure, i.e., whether using monetary and 
non-monetary costs (in combination or separately) influences the estimation results. Thus, we 
first perform all analyses using one cost measure that includes both monetary and non-
monetary costs, and then proceed to use two different cost measures, one for the monetary 
and one for the non-monetary cost component. 
 
3.4 Relation of workers’ and firms’ training decisions 
Finally, we are interested in finding out whether a worker’s individual person-specific 
willingness to bear full training costs is incorporated in the firm’s decision to support training. 
The reason is, that, as mentioned in the theoretical section, firms might have a guess about the 
worker’s training decision in case of not being selected for employer-supported training. 
Therefore, we augment the probit model presented in section 3.1 (equation (1)) to incorporate 
the worker’s willingness to bear the full training costs. 
 
4. Data: survey of participants and non-participants 
The availability of detailed cost information associated with workers’ training participations 
is a necessary precondition for examining the questions raised in our study. We are fortunate 
in being able to use a dataset that provides such extensive cost information. Individuals from a 
large representative sample (of Germany) were contacted by telephone and asked whether 
they had taken part in continuing training in a given period. According to their answer, they 
were either allocated to the participants’ surveys (further analyzed by Beicht et al. 2006) or to 
                                                 
6 Pr(self-financed training=1|employer-supported training=0). It should be kept in mind that this probability is 
different from the “actual” unconditional probability Pr(self-financed training=1, employer-supported 
training=0). 
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the non-participants’ surveys (further analyzed by Schröder et al. 2004).7 For each sample, the 
telephone interviewers used a questionnaire specifically designed for the respective 
respondents. Moreover, there was a list of common questions that individuals in both groups 
were asked to answer, which allows the pulling together of the two datasets. In this paper, we 
use data from both the participant and non-participant surveys. 
Most importantly, this rich dataset allows for the categorization of training participants into 
those who receive employer-supported training and those who bear the full costs of training. 
The two variables representing the firms’ and workers’ training decisions are defined as 
follows: the variable employer-supported training takes the value one if the employer bears 
(part of) the training costs (i.e., covers monetary training costs and/or offers training 
participation during working hours) and zero otherwise.8 The variable self-financed training 
takes the value one if the worker bears full training costs and zero otherwise. We note that the 
term self-financed training refers to both monetary and non-monetary costs. Descriptive 
statistics for the three outcomes of the sequence of training decisions are given in Figure 2:  
Figure 2: Training participation patterns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the numbers in circles indicate percentages. 
Considering full costs, 52.7% of the workers in the sample participated in employer-supported 
training, i.e., their firm covered monetary training costs, provided training during working 
hours, or partially/fully covered both types of training costs.9 In contrast, 3.6% of the 
employees bore full training costs, i.e., training participation occurred completely during 
                                                 
7 For information about the survey design, see Krekel/Walden (2007). 
8 There is a non-negligible proportion of workers reporting no costs. This seems unrealistic for job-related 
training and is therefore classified as employer-supported training (coincident with Booth/Bryan 2007). 
9 Although individuals are not asked to report which part of the financial assistance is provided by the firm, the 
government, or the unemployment insurance system, the assumption of the firm being the main funding source 
should not be very strong because the sample analyzed conditions on employment. 
Employer-supported training
Self-financed training
(Workers bearing full training costs,
given no employer support)
Non-participation Training participation
52.7
3.643.7
STEP 2
STEP 1
Training participation
NO
NO
YES
YES
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leisure time and the workers bore all training expenses. The remaining workers (43.7%) are 
not participating in training. 
As already mentioned, training investments involve both money (referred to as monetary 
costs) and time (referred to as non-monetary costs). This distinction is rarely – if at all – found 
in the training literature. For future research, however, it is important to know whether using 
monetary and non-monetary costs matters, either separately or in combination. Looking at 
monetary and non-monetary costs separately, the dependent variables are defined as follows: 
in relation to monetary costs, employer-supported training is defined as firms covering (part 
of) the pecuniary training costs and self-financed training participation involves workers 
bearing full training expenses; with regard to non-monetary costs, a worker receives 
employer-supported training if training participation occurs (at least partly) during working 
hours, and undertakes self-financed training if participation occurs exclusively during leisure 
time.  
The distribution of participants in employer-supported and self-financed training, categorized 
in terms of monetary and non-monetary costs, is shown in Figure 3. It should be noted that, in 
looking at monetary costs separately, we do not consider how much employer support 
workers receive in terms of non-monetary costs (and vice-versa). In Figure 2, workers are 
categorized by whether they received employer-supported training independent of whether 
they obtained support in terms of both cost components. Figure 3 categorizes workers by the 
support they received in terms of particular cost components. Thus, if not all workers received 
employer support for both cost components, the numbers in employer-supported training 
should be lower and the numbers in self-financed training higher.  
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Figure 3: Training participation patterns for monetary and non-monetary costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the numbers in circles indicate percentages. 
Considering the firms’ decisions, there appears to be no significant difference between the 
two cost components; the probability that training occurs during working hours is slightly 
higher than the probability of receiving financial assistance, though both approach 50 percent. 
In contrast, the workers’ average willingness to bear training costs varies by the type of cost: 
workers whose firms do not cover monetary costs are more likely to participate regardless and 
therefore to bear full training expenses than are those who lack employer support in terms of 
non-monetary costs. This confirms the assumption that time must be seen as a critical factor 
in workers’ training decisions. 
Comparing these numbers with the distribution obtained when using only one cost measure, 
this indicates that most training participants are supported in terms of both cost components. 
Figure 4 shows how monetary and non-monetary support are related. Not surprisingly, the 
vast majority of workers receive employer support in terms of either both cost components or 
neither. With regard to employees whose firm covers either exclusively monetary or 
exclusively non-monetary costs, the latter is much more frequent (6.2% versus 3.8%), but 
both situations are quite rare. 
Training participation
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Self-financed training
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Figure 4: Percentage of workers receiving monetary and/or non-monetary employer support 
Non-monetary support Workers receiving…. 
YES NO 
Total 
YES 42.7 % 6.2 % 48.9 % 
Monetary support 
NO 3.8 % 47.3 % 51.1 % 
Total 46.5 % 53.5 % 100 % 
 
In summary, employer-supported training seems far more widespread than wholly self-
financed training, and this conclusion is in line with existing evidence.10  
As has been shown in section 2, the cost-benefit ratio and thus the willingness to bear training 
costs are determined by individual and employment characteristics. Hence, the explanatory 
variables used in our empirical analyses are those characteristics presented in the theoretical 
section. They correspond to the variables typically used in studies that deal with the 
determinants of training participation.11 The choice of independent variables is especially 
comparable to Bassanini et al. (2005), which is the study most similar to our empirical 
analyses.  
In those specifications which are used to test hypothesis two (which focuses on the relation 
between the firms’ and workers’ training decisions), we additionally include a variable 
representing a worker’s willingness to bear monetary costs as well as a proxy for a worker’s 
willingness to sacrifice leisure time for training participation. The latter variable is a dummy 
variable taking the value one if the worker states that at present he is short of time for training 
participation. 
Concerning training content, which can also be assumed to influence cost-benefit ratios of 
training, we have shown that employer support is theoretically expected for general as well as 
specific human capital. Therefore, we do not restrict our analyses to one type of training 
content. Quite the contrary, the training definition which underlies our analyses includes an 
extensive range of training types12, namely self-organized learning, training programs that 
take place at continuing vocational training institutes, schools or the companies themselves, 
                                                 
10 According to Bassanini et al. (2005: 56-60), cross-country variation in employer-sponsored training courses is 
large. But even in countries with a relatively high share of non-sponsored training, such as in Switzerland, 
Ireland or Italy, the share of employer-sponsored training is at least 50%. 
11 There is no information about union membership in the dataset, so such a variable cannot be included. 
However Pischke (2001) argues that union coverage would be the relevant concept, which is almost universal in 
Germany anyway. 
12 See Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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participation at a congress or conference, and job-related types of training.13 Thus, using such 
a broad training definition, we also identify participants in less formal and, in previous 
studies, less commonly included types of training. 
For our empirical analyses, the sample is restricted to employed workers in the private sector. 
The reason for this focus is that our study analyzes the role that employers play in workers’ 
training decisions. In the case of unemployed or non-employed persons, there is no employer 
at all. Self-employed persons are their own employer and civil servants are supposed to be in 
a different situation with regards to funding training costs, as they are paid by public 
authorities. Moreover, we only include workers aged 25-64, and we exclude any employees 
from the agriculture and forestry sectors. After additionally deleting all respondents who have 
missing information in one of the above variables, 1,365 observations remain. Variable 
definitions and certain descriptive statistics are in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
5. Estimation results for the training decisions of workers and firms 
To analyze the two subsequent training decisions, we first estimate the probability of 
employer-supported training. Second, we estimate the probability of self-financed training 
conditional on receiving no employer support. Based on these estimations, we then predict the 
willingness to bear training costs for the full sample of workers in order to test our hypothesis. 
Finally, we examine whether the worker’s willingness to bear training costs is incorporated in 
the firm’s training decision. We perform all analyses using one cost measure that includes 
both monetary and non-monetary costs and then proceed to use two different cost measures, 
one for the monetary and one for the non-monetary cost component.14  
 
5.1 Analysis of employer-supported training 
We start by looking at the probability of employer-supported training. The estimation results 
of the probit model are presented in Table A3, column 1, in the Appendix.15 The findings are 
broadly consistent with the theoretical considerations presented in section 2: workers with a 
                                                 
13 Of course there might be differences in the intensity of the involvement of firms dependent on the training 
content. Unfortunately, however, for those individuals who have taken part in more than one training type it is 
not possible to assign employer support to the various training participations. Therefore, we cannot distinguish 
between the various training types in our empirical analyses. 
14 It should be noted that all our analyses focus on training costs and do not explicitly model the benefits 
resulting from participation. The underlying assumption is that workers and firms who decide to invest in 
training do so with the expectation of positive returns. 
15 The probit estimates, presented in Table A3, have been transformed to show the marginal effects at the mean 
using the estimation procedure explained in Bartus (2005). We proceed in this way throughout the section. 
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secondary or tertiary educational degree, who are highly motivated for participation in 
training, who are full-time employed, or who are below 35 years of age all have higher 
training probabilities. The former two findings confirm the assumption that there is a 
complementarity between further training and formal education16 as well as motivation; the 
latter finding is in line with human capital theory, which predicts the incentive to invest in 
training to be higher the longer is the expected pay-off period. Interestingly, none of the 
variables that reflect gender or family caring responsibilities seem to determine the likelihood 
of training. Thus, there is no evidence either for discrimination or for employers selecting 
workers on the basis of their perceived commitment to the firm.  
Regarding employment characteristics, being a white-collar worker, facing changing 
knowledge and skill requirements and being employed in a large enterprise are all associated 
with substantially higher probabilities of receiving employer-supported training. This is 
consistent with the assumption that the production process and resulting skill requirements 
considerably impact a firm’s training decision. Lastly, larger firms have a higher training 
probability, which might be due to economies of scale (i.e., fixed costs can be divided 
between more workers), lower production losses from absent workers (who are away from 
their jobs during the training period), or reduced risk of poaching externalities because of, for 
example, the existence of internal labor markets, which provide career opportunities 
(Lynch/Black 1998: 65-66). 
Besides the individual and employment characteristics we include an additional variable 
indicating the training fraction by industry. In a next step (cf. section 5.2), in which we 
analyze the probability of self-financing training conditional on receiving no employer 
support, this variable is used as an exclusion restriction. The variable satisfies the exclusion 
restrictions and therefore qualifies for an instrumental variable because it correlates with the 
probability of receiving employer-supported training. 17 
Looking at monetary and non-monetary costs separately, the main patterns found in the 
analyses which has been performed by using a cost measure that includes all types of training 
are confirmed. The estimation results are shown in Table A4 and A5, column 1, in the 
Appendix. The most striking difference concerns the gender effect. Male workers are 
significantly more likely to receive employer support in terms of non-monetary costs than are 
female workers. This finding might be due to gender differences in negotiations. There is, for 
                                                 
16 Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that estimates of the effects of education also pick up ability. 
However, for the purposes of this study, this is not crucial. Therefore, we do not present an elaborate discussion 
of the existence of a potential heterogeneity bias. 
17 Moreover, it seems plausible to assume that after controlling for industry sector, the training fraction by 
industry should not have an impact on the probability of self-financing training participation.  
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instance, empirical evidence that women compared to men ask for less in pay negotiations 
(see for example Säve-Sörderbergh 2007). In the case of training this gender-specific behavior 
might result in a lower probability of being released from work to participate in training. 
Interestingly, regarding monetary costs, we do not find a difference between the two genders. 
We interpret this difference in terms of the two cost components as an indication that firms 
are rather willing to cover monetary costs than to provide training participation during 
working hours. To receive the latter, considerable negotiation skills might be essential.   
Of course, separate estimations for male and female workers might be more appropriate for 
the analysis of training participation patterns. Therefore, we additionally provide the results of 
separate estimations by gender (cf. Table A3, column 2 and 3, in the Appendix). The main 
differences between male and female employees can be summarized as follows: for female 
employees, being aged below 35, having children, and being employed part-time is associated 
with a significantly lower probability of receiving employer-supported training. Firms might 
associate all these characteristics with a lower attachment to the firm. For male workers, 
however, this does not apply: none of these characteristics turns out to be significant. With the 
exception of the child effect, these results also hold when looking at monetary and non-
monetary costs separately (cf. Table A4 and A5, column 2 and 3, in the Appendix). 
Interestingly, for women, having children “solely” affects the probability of (not) being 
supported in terms of non-monetary costs. This supports our assumption that distinguishing 
between the two cost components is important for analyzing training decisions, as firms seem 
to provide differing support in terms of monetary and non-monetary costs.  
 
5.2 Analysis of workers bearing full training costs, given no employer support 
Those workers who do not receive employer-supported training might consider bearing the 
full training costs themselves. To analyze the probability of self-financing training conditional 
on receiving no employer support, we estimate a bivariate model with censoring that takes 
into account unobserved factors influencing the firm’s and worker’s training decisions. The 
hypothesis that the correlation ρ between the selection equation and the outcome equation is 
zero cannot be rejected.18 This implies that those factors that are not controlled in our 
estimations but that do affect training decisions are not the same (or at least are not correlated) 
across workers’ and firms’ decisions. This is not surprising, given that we suppose to have 
                                                 
18 Bassanini et al. (2005) do find a selection effect for sponsored and non-sponsored training. Their definition of 
training and of sponsored vs. non-sponsored training is very different, however, meaning that the results are not 
directly comparable.  
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included most of the variables that can be assumed to exert influence on both decisions. Thus, 
we can use a simple probit model to estimate the outcome equation.19 The results are shown 
in Table A3, column 4, in the Appendix. 
Except from the finding that the education level does not (significantly) affect the probability 
of receiving employer-supported training, all variables show the expected influence: more 
motivated, childless and middle age workers are more likely to still participate in training 
even though they are not selected for employer-supported training. 
As soon as we separately consider monetary and non-monetary costs, we find an education 
effect (cf. Table A4 and A5, column 4, in the Appendix). Better-educated workers have a 
higher willingness to pay for training as well as to sacrifice leisure time for training 
participation. This is in line with the theoretical predictions, which suppose a 
complementarity between education and training, resulting in a more favorable cost-benefit 
ratio for highly educated workers. The puzzle to be solved is why these workers, for whom 
training participation is individually beneficial, are not supported by their employer. One 
explanation is to be found in the differing expectations concerning the continuation of the 
work relation. For instance, firms might expect highly educated workers to have attractive 
outside options, for which reason the risk of losing an investment in training is high. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that workers with tertiary education are overrepresented 
in the group of employees who self-finance their training participation.  
Although none of the estimations indicates a gender effect, we briefly sketch the most 
interesting result when performing separate estimations. In contrast to the estimations of 
employer-supported training, we find that for women having children reduces the willingness 
to pay for training but does not influence the willingness to bear non-monetary costs. For 
male workers, we again do not find a difference. 
 
5.3 Analysis of predicted probabilities that workers would bear the full training costs 
Given that the share of self-financed training is much smaller than that of employer-supported 
training, it is even more important to know who is able and willing to bear full training costs. 
Thus, as a next step, we predict the probability of self-financing training for the full sample of 
workers, conditional on receiving no employer-supported training (cf. Table 1).  
                                                 
19 As the hypothesis that the correlation between the two equations is zero cannot be rejected for either 
estimation performed, we proceed in this way throughout the section.  
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Table 1: Predicted training probabilities conditional on receiving no employer support, 
including all types of costs 
 
Workers who currently receive 
employer-supported training 
Workers who do not receive 
employer-supported training Mean comparison test 
 
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers
Female 
Workers
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers 
          
0.1516 0.1715 0.1197 0.0759 0.0911 0.0355 *** *** *** Monetary and non-
monetary costs (0.0058) (0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0043) (0.0070) (0.0042)    
 
This predicted probability is, on average, 7.59% for those presently not receiving employer-
supported training, and 15.16% for those whose training costs are currently shared or 
completely covered by the firm. A mean comparison test shows that the difference between 
these average predicted probabilities is highly significant. Thus, the results are consistent with 
our hypothesis: those who currently receive employer support would also have a higher 
probability of still participating in training had they not received this support. The fact that 
firms support some workers who would also be willing to bear the full training costs seems 
counterintuitive, at least at first sight, and should be investigated in more detail. One 
explanation could be that firms pursue various associated side benefits by providing training, 
such as increasing employees’ commitment to the firm or signaling good career opportunities 
to outside workers. We will discuss various explanations in the next section. 
Performing separate estimations by gender demonstrates that female workers are 
systematically less likely to bear the full training costs. These large differences, however, 
have to be interpreted with some caution, as the estimation for female workers can only be 
performed for a reduced sample (cf. Table A3, column 6, in the Appendix). 
Again, predicted probabilities of self-financing training conditional on receiving no employer 
support are additionally calculated separately for monetary and non-monetary costs. This 
reveals interesting new insights.  
Table 2: Predicted training probabilities conditional on receiving no employer support in respect 
of the considered cost component 
 
Workers who currently receive 
employer support in the 
considered cost component 
Workers who do not receive 
employer support in the 
considered cost component 
Mean comparison test 
 
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers
Female 
Workers
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers 
          
0.2945 0.3153 0.2919 0.1830 0.2076 0.1571 *** *** *** Monetary costs (0.0083) (0.0107) (0.0163) (0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0112)    
          
0.2392 0.2321 0.2593 0.1433 0.1441 0.1438 *** *** *** Non-monetary costs (0.0061) (0.0087) (0.0112) (0.0046) (0.0074) (0.0072)    
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With regard to monetary costs, the results demonstrate that those workers whose firm 
currently pays (part of) the training expenses would also have a significantly higher 
willingness to bear the full monetary costs had they not received any employer support. This 
predicted probability exceeds by more than half the probability for the group of workers who 
currently do not receive financial assistance. This difference is highly significant. Not 
surprisingly, the numbers for both groups are higher than those for the analysis using a cost 
measure including all types of costs (cf. Table 1). Some workers who do not receive financial 
assistance might still be supported in terms of non-monetary costs. This, however, is not the 
norm, as has been shown in the previous section. 
Turning to the results for non-monetary costs, one notices that the predicted training 
probabilities conditional on receiving no employer support in terms of non-monetary costs are 
considerably lower than those found for monetary costs. Receiving the opportunity to 
undertake training during working hours is a better predictor of actual participation than 
receiving financial support. This indicates the importance of training opportunities during 
working hours. Comparing workers who receive training during working hours with those 
who do not, the main patterns found with respect to monetary costs remain evident. Hence, 
the hypothesis test is also confirmed for monetary and non-monetary costs. However, the 
predicted probabilities vary systematically according to the cost component examined. These 
differences are even more pronounced when considering male and female workers separately. 
Men have on average a higher willingness to bear monetary costs than do women. The 
difference is even higher in the group of workers who presently do not receive employer 
support. In contrast, women would be at least as likely as men to fully participate during 
leisure time.  
In summary, workers’ average willingness to bear the full training costs is rather low. This 
applies to both groups of workers analyzed but is even more pronounced in the group of those 
employees who are presently not considered for employer-supported training. Obviously, 
firms moderate practically all training decisions and thus considerably influence training 
(non-)participation patterns. Concerning different cost components, our findings demonstrate 
that there are systematic differences in the respective willingness to bear the full training 
costs. Workers are a lot more likely to pay for training than they are to sacrifice leisure time. 
Thus, non-monetary costs seem to form the more binding restriction. 
Up to this point, we have not analyzed whether firms consider workers’ willingness to bear 
training costs. This is the focus of the next section and might help to explain the observed 
training participation patterns.  
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5.4 Analyses of the relation of workers’ and firms’ training decisions 
In the previous section, we have shown that those workers who receive employer-supported 
training would also be the ones more likely to have borne the full training costs themselves 
had they not received employer support. The question to be answered is why firms support 
some workers who would also be willing to bear the full training costs themselves. There are 
several explanations for this phenomenon, which will be discussed in the following.  
Basically, there are two explanatory approaches, which differ in their underlying assumption 
on whether firms (can) consider workers’ willingness to bear training costs in their training 
decisions. Theoretically, we expect that a firm invests in training if benefits exceed costs. 
Thus, we would assume that a worker’s willingness to bear training costs is not incorporated 
in the firm’s training decision. The empirical findings could also be explained by the 
existence of information asymmetry. In this case, firms cannot identify those workers who 
would also be willing to self-finance their training participation, or identification would be 
very costly. Both explanations predict that firms’ decisions are made independently of the 
workers’ willingness to bear the full training costs. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the patterns observed are a result of firms’ human resource 
strategies. Training either constitutes a component of a worker’s compensation package or is 
used as a means of improving an employee’s commitment to the firm. Of course firms do not 
know a worker’s exact willingness to bear training costs, but they might have a guess about it. 
Thus, we expect that a worker’s willingness to bear training costs is positively associated with 
his probability of receiving employer support because the former indicates a worker’s interest 
in – as well as his benefit from – training.  
In order to investigate which explanation approach is supported by the empirical evidence, we 
incorporate two variables representing a worker’s willingness to bear training costs into the 
estimation model used to analyze a firm’s training decision. On the one hand, we include a 
variable indicating whether a worker is willing to pay for training. On the other hand, we use 
a worker’s statement of whether he lacks time to participate in training as a proxy for his 
willingness to sacrifice leisure time for training. The results are presented in Table 3 (for the 
detailed estimation results see Table A6 in the Appendix). 
  
 22
Table 3: Relation of training decisions 
 Employer-supported training 
 Monetary and non-monetary costs Monetary costs 
Non-monetary 
costs 
  
  
0.2267*** 0.1700***  Willingness to pay (0.0458) (0.0432)  
-0.1447***  -0.1399*** Lack of time (0.0298)  (0.0296) 
    
Individual characteristics YES YES YES 
Employment characteristics YES YES YES 
    
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1365 1365 1365 
Notes: Marginal effects at the mean; std.errors are in parentheses; *statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 
level, ***at the 0.01 level. 
In favor of the latter approach (i.e., the commitment explanation), the variable representing a 
worker’s willingness to pay for training turns out to have a significant positive impact on the 
probability of receiving employer-supported training.20 Moreover, workers who state that they 
lack time for training participation are not more but actually less likely to be selected for 
employer-supported training. These patterns also hold when looking at monetary and non-
monetary costs separately and when performing separate estimations by gender.21 Thus, the 
probability of receiving employer-supported training is not independent of but rather 
positively associated with a worker’s willingness to bear training costs. 
Although the main aim of training has to be seen in increasing workers’ productivity, firms 
seem to pursue a strategy of increasing workers’ commitment to the firm by also providing 
employer support in training participation. Thus, they consciously accept that some of these 
workers would also be willing to self-finance their training. Of course, we would need more 
detailed information about a firm’s human resource strategy in order to conclusively confirm 
this explanation. However, we interpret our estimation results as evidence in favor of such a 
relation. 
Alternatively, the findings could indicate that sharing of training costs is widespread and 
requires that workers are willing to partly pay for training and also to participate during 
leisure time. However, as for two thirds of those workers who are selected for employer-
supported training firms cover the full monetary and non-monetary training costs, this 
explanation is unlikely. 
                                                 
20 The main results presented in section 5.1 still hold after introducing the two additional variables. This 
indicates that although other individual characteristics might be correlated with the willingness to bear training 
costs, this does not have an impact on their determination of the probability of employer-supported training. 
21 The results from separate estimations for male and female workers can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
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Of course, training content as well as the aim of training might systematically vary between 
the two groups (i.e., those workers who receive employer-supported training and those who 
bear the full training costs themselves).22 We would expect firms to predominantly support 
training that increases a worker’s productivity within the firm, while workers who self-
finance their training might generally aim at improving their labor market prospects. This, 
however, is not within the scope of our study but could be an interesting question for further 
research.  
Finally, training might not only be useful for increasing employees’ commitment to the firm 
but also for attracting new workers and thus for improving recruitment success (Backes-
Gellner/Tuor 2010, forthcoming). This explanation neither supports nor contradicts the 
finding presented in Table 3 and unfortunately cannot be tested with the current dataset, 
which does not provide the necessary information about a firm’s vacancy rate or recruitment 
success. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We empirically examined training decisions of workers and firms, with a focus on training 
costs. Our analysis distinguished monetary from non-monetary costs in order to learn how 
various cost components affect workers’ (non-)participation in training. The results show that 
employer support in terms of both monetary and non-monetary costs is crucial for training 
participation. The latter have rarely been considered in the literature to date but seem to form 
the main binding restrictions. 
The use of an exceptionally rich dataset allowed us to identify the employer’s selection 
process separate from the worker’s willingness to bear full training costs and also allowed us 
to compare the importance of monetary and non-monetary costs. This yields new insights into 
non-participation patterns in particular. Interestingly, the findings show that the (predicted) 
probability of self-financing training participation is generally low but that it is higher for 
those presently receiving employer-supported training. Aside from this, the prevalence of 
employer-supported training found in previous studies is confirmed. Obviously, firms 
moderate virtually all training decisions. Accordingly, policies aiming at increasing training 
participation should consider firms’ incentives for providing training.  
Looking at monetary and non-monetary cost components separately, the main patterns remain 
evident: non-participation can be attributed to a lower willingness (or ability) of these workers 
                                                 
22 For instance, Pischke (2001) provides some evidence that training during leisure time is associated with more 
pronounced wage growth than is training during working hours (though the effect is not significant).  
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to bear full training costs, as well as to a lack of employer support in terms of both monetary 
and non-monetary costs. However, non-monetary costs have rarely been considered 
(separately) in the literature but seem to form the binding restriction. The question to be 
answered, then, is why firms do not provide more support in terms of non-monetary costs. 
One explanation for firms providing financial assistance over training during working hours is 
that the latter might result in overtime, which is more costly for the company than is covering 
training expenses. Another probable explanation is that in small firms, for instance, in which 
the production process is dependent on every single worker, participation during working 
hours might simply be impossible (as this would result in production loss). Nevertheless, 
support for a worker’s training participation during leisure time might be possible.  
Alternatively, one could argue that firms just do not know about the existence of time 
restrictions. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Quite the contrary: workers’ 
willingness to bear training costs is positively associated with receiving employer support in 
training participation. We assume that firms thereby pursue a strategy of increasing workers’ 
commitment to the firm. Thus, the observed relation is rather the result of conscious decisions 
made by firms than the result of allocation problems concerning training support within firms.  
Of course, the final responsibility of participating in training rests on the individual worker. 
Nevertheless, a society should aim at having an educational and further training system that 
ensures a productive populace. It would therefore be interesting to combine an analysis of 
different benefits with an examination of the various cost components and thereby evaluate 
firms’ incentives to provide training. This may be an issue for future research, assuming the 
existence of an appropriate dataset. Until then, one should keep in mind that, for both the 
worker and the firm, time seems to be more costly than money. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Types of training included 
NAME OF CATEGORY TYPES OF TRAINING REPORTED IN THE SURVEY 
Self-organized cvt 
Self-organized continuing vocational training: 
distance learning course 
computer based learning 
self-organized learning using TV, radio or video 
self-organized learning using textbooks, teaching material or technical literature 
Training program  
(cvt inst./school) 
Seminar, course, training 
at a continuing vocational training institute 
at a technical school 
continuing vocational training in the scientific domain 
Congress, conference Technical lecture, congress, conference, trade fair 
Training program  
(company) 
Seminar, course, training 
at the (own) company, at a manufacturer, at a supplier 
Job-integrated learning 
Types of further qualifications that are closely related to job 
organized initial skill adaptation training or instruction at the workplace, trainee-program 
operational activities to increase occupational qualification 
operational exchange activities (e.g. with another company) 
activities of occupational orientation 
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Table A2: Definitions and descriptives of variables 
Variable Definition Mean (Std.dev.) 
     
  Full Sample Participants 
  Non-participants Participants 
Employer-
supported 
Self-
financed 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE      
0.5267  Employer-supported training 1 if firm covers (part of) worker’s training costs, 0 otherwise (0.4995)  
 
Self-financed training 
1 if worker bears full training costs 
(cond. on receiving no employer-
supported training), 0 otherwise 
0.0759 
(0.2650)  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE      
Individual Characteristics      
0.0553 0.0234 0.0195 0.0816 No educational degree Reference (0.2287) (0.1514) (0.1383) (0.2766) 
0.8208 0.5872 0.6022 0.3673 Secondary education  (0.3839) (0.4927) (0.4898) (0.4871) 
0.1240 0.3893 0.3783 0.5510 Tertiary education  (0.3298) (0.4879) (0.4853) (0.5025) 
0.5176 0.5885 0.5855 0.6327 Male 1 if a person is male, 0 otherwise (0.5001) (0.4924) (0.4930) (0.7871) 
0.4489 0.4453 0.4506 0.3673 Child 1 if a person has at least one child, 0 otherwise (0.4978) (0.4973) (0.4979) (0.4871) 
0.2563 0.2526 0.2448 0.3673 Age25_34  (0.4369) (0.4348) (0.4303) (0.4871) 
0.3652 0.4115 0.4103 0.4286 Age35_44 Reference (0.4819) (0.4924) (0.4922) (0.5000) 
0.2781 0.2630 0.2726 0.1224 Age45_54  (0.4484) (0.4406) (0.4456) (0.3312) 
0.1005 0.0729 0.0723 0.0816 Age55_64  (0.3010) (0.2602) (0.2592) (0.2766) 
0.2563 0.1641 0.1599 0.2245 Part-time employment 1 if a person is employed part-time, 0 if a person is employed full-time (0.4369) (0.3706) (0.3668) (0.4216) 
0.7990 0.9440 0.9458 0.9184 Motivation 1 if training and learning is fun (0.4011) (0.2301) (0.2267) (0.2766) 
0.7822 0.9466 0.9430  Willingness to pay 1 if willingness to pay in Euro >0, 0 otherwise  (0.4131) (0.2249) (0.2920)  
0.5477 0.3646 0.3602  Lack of time 1 if there is lack of time for training participation, 0 otherwise (0.4981) (0.4816) (0.4804)  
Employment Characteristics      
0.6030 0.8555 0.8554 0.8571 White-collar worker 1 if a person is a white-collar worker, 0 if a person is a blue-collar worker (0.4897) (0.3519) (0.3520) (0.3536) 
0.4874 0.7122 0.7177 0.6327 Change 1 if knowledge and skill needs change, 0 otherwise (0.5003) (0.4530) (0.4504) (0.4871) 
2.3774 2.1085 2.1314 1.7714 Experience (divided by 10) Labor market experience (in 10 years) (1.0136) (1.0119) (1.0054) (1.0559) 
0.1910 0.0977 0.0904 0.2041 Micro enterprise <10 employees, Reference (0.3934) (0.2970) (0.2870) (0.4072) 
0.4204 0.3372 0.3338 0.3878 Small&medium-sized enterprise 10-249 employees (0.4940) (0.4731) (0.4719) (0.4923) 
0.3886 0.5651 0.5758 0.4082 Large enterprise >249 employees (0.4878) (0.4961) (0.4946) (0.4966) 
0.1457 0.0755 0.0751 0.0816 Primary sector of industry  (0.3531) (0.2644) (0.2637) (0.2766) 
0.3082 0.2734 0.2726 0.2857 Secondary sector of industry Reference (0.4621) (0.4460) (0.4456) (0.4564) 
0.5461 0.6510 0.6523 0.6327 Tertiary sector of industry  (0.4983) (0.4770) (0.4766) (0.4871) 
Instrumental variable      
0.4794 0.5370 0.5387  Fraction of training by industry Fraction of employer-supported training by industry code (0.1138) (0.1159) (0.1167)  
Note: The firm size categories are according to the EU-definition. 
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Table A3: Employer-supported and self-financed training: including all types of costs 
 Employer-supported training Self-financed training 
 Full Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers 
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers° 
Individual characteristics       
No educational degree Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.1839** 0.2740** 0.1228 -0.0453 -0.1002 0.025 Secondary education (0.0758) (0.1099) (0.1073) (0.0403) (0.0635) (0.0456) 
0.3030*** 0.3445*** 0.3110*** 0.104 0.0396 0.2059 Tertiary education (0.0811) (0.1155) (0.1175) (0.0852) (0.0948) (0.2824) 
0.0528   0.0206   Male (0.0361)   (0.0168)   
-0.0094 0.0461 -0.1040* -0.0283* -0.0204 -0.0433 Child (0.0328) (0.0416) (0.0547) (0.0163) (0.0194) (0.0379) 
-0.2343** -0.0955 -0.3666*** -0.0852* -0.0658 -0.5967***Age25_34 (0.1038) (0.1472) (0.1387) (0.0478) (0.0809) (0.1320) 
-0.0811 0.01 -0.1327 -0.0537 -0.0399 -0.5328***Age35_44 (0.0946) (0.1278) (0.1380) (0.0656) (0.1065) (0.2048) 
0.0024 0.0826 -0.085 -0.0644* -0.0393 -0.4951***Age45_54 (0.0716) (0.0960) (0.1082) (0.0371) (0.0701) (0.1245) 
Age55_64 Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
-0.1392*** -0.1484 -0.1214** 0.0088 0.0297 -0.0093 Part-time employment (0.0422) (0.1159) (0.0505) (0.0226) (0.0529) (0.0369) 
0.2467*** 0.2543*** 0.2521*** 0.0249* 0.0043  Motivation (0.0437) (0.0581) (0.0648) (0.0151) (0.0242)  
Employment characteristics       
0.2325*** 0.2768*** 0.2217*** 0.0358** 0.0324  White-collar worker (0.0371) (0.0453) (0.0658) (0.0155) (0.0236)  
0.1501*** 0.1447*** 0.1648*** 0.0209 0.0416* 0.0013 Change (0.0300) (0.0409) (0.0448) (0.0157) (0.0235) (0.0280) 
-0.0591 -0.125 0.016 -0.0458 -0.0192 -0.1063** Experience (divided by 10) (0.0776) (0.0976) (0.1281) (0.0319) (0.0475) (0.0537) 
-0.0011 0.001 -0.0032 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0003 Experience squared (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Micro enterprise Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.0914** 0.065 0.1093* -0.0305 -0.1155** 0.038 Small and medium-sized enterprise (0.0454) (0.0687) (0.0621) (0.0246) (0.0450) (0.0379) 
0.1874*** 0.1365* 0.2408*** -0.0394* -0.1228*** 0.02 Large enterprise (0.0456) (0.0697) (0.0618) (0.0226) (0.0434) (0.0376) 
0.0855 0.0255 0.2153* -0.0202 -0.0534** 0.0577 Primary sector of industry (0.0549) (0.0641) (0.1143) (0.0215) (0.0231) (0.1129) 
Secondary sector of industry Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.0074 -0.0648 0.1469** -0.0077 -0.0349 0.0407 Tertiary sector of industry (0.0365) (0.0459) (0.0605) (0.0198) (0.0266) (0.0265) 
0.7191*** 0.6562*** 0.7511***    Fraction of training by industry (0.1509) (0.2167) (0.2119)    
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1365 761 604 646 340 203 
Notes: Marginal effects at the mean; std.errors are in parentheses; *statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 
level, ***at the 0.01 level; ° Low motivation as well as being a blue-collar worker predicts failure perfectly for which reason 
those workers are not included in the respective estimation. 
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Table A4: Employer-supported and self-financed training: monetary costs 
 Employer-supported training Self-financed training 
 Full Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers 
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers 
Individual characteristics       
No educational degree Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.1353* 0.1716 0.1262 -0.0068 -0.0146 0.0005 Secondary education (0.0744) (0.1089) (0.1052) (0.0571) (0.0791) (0.0658) 
0.2029** 0.2299** 0.1933 0.2301** 0.1705 0.2886 Tertiary education (0.0828) (0.1161) (0.1249) (0.1060) (0.1238) (0.1952) 
0.0302   0.0414   Male (0.0350)   (0.0304)   
0.0045 0.0361 -0.0466 -0.0543* -0.0172 -0.0717** Child (0.0320) (0.0412) (0.0526) (0.0295) (0.0405) (0.0346) 
-0.2879*** -0.1173 -0.4355*** -0.0299 0.0608 -0.2196***Age25_34 (0.1003) (0.1445) (0.1314) (0.0701) (0.1142) (0.0671) 
-0.1798* -0.0541 -0.2626* 0.0633 0.1482 -0.1176 Age35_44 (0.0946) (0.1291) (0.1370) (0.0926) (0.1382) (0.1377) 
-0.0985 -0.0022 -0.1797 0.0747 0.1672 -0.1112 Age45_54 (0.0743) (0.1009) (0.1095) (0.0736) (0.1168) (0.0956) 
Age55_64 Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
-0.1437*** -0.1489 -0.1383*** -0.0209 0.0298 -0.0349 Part-time employment (0.0403) (0.1114) (0.0483) (0.0353) (0.0962) (0.0331) 
0.2479*** 0.2467*** 0.2514*** 0.0710** 0.0684 0.0655** Motivation (0.0402) (0.0544) (0.0584) (0.0302) (0.0438) (0.0283) 
Employment characteristics       
0.2270*** 0.2649*** 0.1918*** 0.0929*** 0.1095** 0.1094*** White-collar worker (0.0355) (0.0445) (0.0630) (0.0280) (0.0435) (0.0248) 
0.1150*** 0.1133*** 0.1227*** 0.0894*** 0.1126*** 0.0553* Change (0.0296) (0.0406) (0.0436) (0.0270) (0.0391) (0.0314) 
0.0824 0.0377 0.119 -0.2006*** -0.2406** -0.1619** Experience (divided by 10) (0.0742) (0.0953) (0.1161) (0.0652) (0.0959) (0.0785) 
-0.0036** -0.0017 -0.0053** 0.0027* 0.0034 0.0017 Experience squared (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0015) 
Micro enterprise Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.0792* 0.0749 0.0947 -0.0002 -0.0919 0.036 Small and medium-sized enterprise (0.0443) (0.0671) (0.0594) (0.0390) (0.0647) (0.0358) 
0.1758*** 0.1707** 0.1928*** 0.0087 -0.1053 0.0710* Large enterprise (0.0453) (0.0690) (0.0609) (0.0401) (0.0665) (0.0405) 
0.0637 0.0213 0.1789 0.0122 -0.0619 0.062 Primary sector of industry (0.0568) (0.0669) (0.1166) (0.0496) (0.0576) (0.0855) 
Secondary sector of industry Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
-0.0044 -0.0593 0.1057* 0.0249 -0.046 0.0964*** Tertiary sector of industry (0.0352) (0.0447) (0.0574) (0.0316) (0.0466) (0.0297) 
0.6422*** 0.5446** 0.7185***    Fraction of training by industry (0.1762) (0.2497) (0.2463)    
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1365 761 604 731 390 341 
Notes: Marginal effects at the mean; std.errors are in parentheses; *statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 
level, ***at the 0.01 level. 
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Table A5: Employer-supported and self-financed training: non-monetary costs 
 Employer-supported training Self-financed training 
 Full Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers 
Full 
Sample 
Male 
Workers 
Female 
Workers 
Individual characteristics       
No educational degree Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.1590** 0.2482** 0.0808 -0.0141 -0.0912 0.0639 Secondary education (0.0761) (0.1102) (0.1093) (0.0515) (0.0828) (0.0522) 
0.2753*** 0.3049*** 0.3002** 0.1701* 0.1042 0.2064 Tertiary education (0.0837) (0.1177) (0.1238) (0.0975) (0.1251) (0.1643) 
0.0719**   0.0018   Male (0.0359)   (0.0293)   
-0.0104 0.0513 -0.1007* -0.0377 -0.0202 -0.0649 Child (0.0328) (0.0419) (0.0535) (0.0272) (0.0336) (0.0443) 
-0.2365** -0.0229 -0.4457*** -0.0779 -0.1327 -0.1312 Age25_34 (0.1048) (0.1499) (0.1265) (0.0663) (0.1001) (0.0815) 
-0.0954 0.0742 -0.2417* 0.0013 -0.0825 0.0078 Age35_44 (0.0992) (0.1317) (0.1384) (0.0877) (0.1225) (0.1502) 
-0.0061 0.1038 -0.1317 -0.0015 0.0024 -0.0721 Age45_54 (0.0762) (0.1018) (0.1105) (0.0643) (0.1129) (0.0869) 
Age55_64 Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
-0.1440*** -0.1714 -0.1253** -0.0002 0.0245 0.0078 Part-time employment (0.0413) (0.1113) (0.0493) (0.0335) (0.0825) (0.0417) 
0.2212*** 0.2133*** 0.2490*** 0.0830*** 0.0763** 0.0796** Motivation (0.0434) (0.0588) (0.0621) (0.0247) (0.0316) (0.0353) 
Employment characteristics       
0.2452*** 0.2975*** 0.2325*** 0.0504* 0.0341 0.0652* White-collar worker (0.0359) (0.0447) (0.0606) (0.0281) (0.0382) (0.0390) 
0.1510*** 0.1525*** 0.1509*** 0.0511** 0.0612* 0.0604* Change (0.0299) (0.0409) (0.0442) (0.0242) (0.0330) (0.0333) 
-0.0446 -0.1471 0.0813 -0.1219** -0.0882 -0.1778** Experience (divided by 10) (0.0777) (0.0986) (0.1268) (0.0616) (0.0854) (0.0808) 
-0.0014 0.0016 -0.0047* 0.0014 0.0004 0.0022 Experience squared (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
Micro enterprise Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.0963** 0.1014 0.0908 -0.0181 -0.1363** 0.0581 Small and medium-sized enterprise (0.0448) (0.0691) (0.0601) (0.0366) (0.0614) (0.0437) 
0.2099*** 0.2050*** 0.2279*** -0.0396 -0.1856*** 0.067 Large enterprise (0.0454) (0.0700) (0.0613) (0.0350) (0.0533) (0.0461) 
0.0898 0.0262 0.1904 0.0111 -0.0388 0.1315 Primary sector of industry (0.0572) (0.0664) (0.1256) (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.1080) 
Secondary sector of industry Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
-0.0046 -0.0774* 0.1314** 0.0412 0.0155 0.0801** Tertiary sector of industry (0.0361) (0.0453) (0.0591) (0.0302) (0.0423) (0.0361) 
0.7510*** 0.5869*** 0.8502***    Fraction of training by industry (0.1475) (0.2072) (0.2087)    
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
N 1365 761 604 697 361 336 
Notes: Marginal effects at the mean; std.errors are in parentheses; *statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 
level, ***at the 0.01 level. 
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Table A6: Relation of training decisions 
 Employer-supported training 
 Monetary & non-monetary costs Monetary costs 
Non-monetary 
costs 
Individual characteristics    
No educational degree Reference Reference Reference 
0.1853** 0.1245 0.1732** Secondary education (0.0796) (0.0760) (0.0769) 
0.2833*** 0.1848** 0.2769*** Tertiary education (0.0858) (0.0841) (0.0855) 
0.0528 0.0291 0.0724** Male (0.0367) (0.0353) (0.0360) 
0.0097 0.0084 0.0047 Child (0.0335) (0.0321) (0.0333) 
-0.2636** -0.3024*** -0.2488** Age25_34 (0.1072) (0.1012) (0.1061) 
-0.1235 -0.1985** -0.1152 Age35_44 (0.0976) (0.0953) (0.1002) 
-0.0371 -0.113 -0.0289 Age45_54 (0.0739) (0.0749) (0.0773) 
Age55_64 Reference Reference Reference 
-0.1454*** -0.1454*** -0.1478*** Part-time employment (0.0425) (0.0403) (0.0414) 
0.2160*** 0.2296*** 0.2152*** Motivation (0.0467) (0.0421) (0.0441) 
0.2267*** 0.1700***  Willingness to pay (0.0458) (0.0432)  
-0.1447***  -0.1399*** Lack of time (0.0298)  (0.0296) 
Employment characteristics    
0.2180*** 0.2171*** 0.2436*** White-collar worker (0.0381) (0.0359) (0.0361) 
0.1502*** 0.1143*** 0.1511*** Change (0.0305) (0.0297) (0.0302) 
-0.0339 0.0831 -0.0239 Experience (divided by 10) (0.0787) (0.0742) (0.0786) 
-0.0015 -0.0036** -0.0019 Experience squared (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
Micro enterprise Reference Reference Reference 
0.0976** 0.0797* 0.1001** Small and medium-sized enterprise (0.0461) (0.0444) (0.0450) 
0.1808*** 0.1723*** 0.2076*** Large enterprise (0.0461) (0.0452) (0.0455) 
0.0744 0.0608 0.079 Primary sector of industry (0.0557) (0.0568) (0.0577) 
Secondary sector of industry Reference Reference Reference 
0.0007 -0.0062 -0.0107 Tertiary sector of industry (0.0369) (0.0354) (0.0361) 
0.6911*** 0.6443*** 0.7082*** Fraction of training by industry (0.1510) (0.1756) (0.1474) 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 1365 1365 1365 
Notes: Marginal effects at the mean; std.errors are in parentheses; *statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 
level, ***at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
